There is growing evidence in the finance literature that media coverage can influence security pricing by facilitating news dissemination and reducing informational frictions even if it does not provide new information. This study examines the role of media coverage in the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. We show that differential level of news coverage for the same firm by Chinese and English media is significantly associated with the foreign share discount. Specifically, the discount is greater among firms with relatively more Chinese than English press coverage. We also find this effect more pronounced among firms with less analyst following and less institutional ownership. This implies that media coverage compensates for limitations in analyst coverage and is more influential among less sophisticated investors. Our evidence is robust to controls of other determinants of Chinese foreign share discount documented by previous literature. Despite of the widespread belief that the Chinese media is tightly controlled, our study reveals that it still plays an influential role in the capital market.
Introduction
There is increasing empirical evidence in the finance literature that media coverage serves as information intermediary in the capital market and therefore affects security pricing (e.g. Fan and Peress, 2009; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008) . To the extent that the media facilitates financial information dissemination to the wider public by reducing the informational costs and providing credibility (Dyck and Zingales, 2003) , these findings confirms that media contributes to the corporate information environment available to investors. However, these researches are carried out in developed countries such as the US where the media is more independent and competitive. Thus, evidence from these studies may not necessarily apply to emerging countries such as China where the media are assumed to be under tighter control. Thus, to what extend media coverage can influence security pricing in the capital market of emerging countries is an interesting and open question.
To answer this question, we exploit the well-documented foreign share discount puzzle of China. Unlike segmented stock market of other countries, the foreign B-shares issued by Chinese firms are largely traded at a discount instead of premium relative to local A-shares issued by the same firm despite of identical cash flow and voting rights (Bailey et al., 1999) .
Since A-and B-shares depend on the same stream of future cash flows, the price differentials between these shares reflects that local and foreign investors perceives the risk of the same firm differently. Existing literature put forward many explanations to this phenomenon, including market liquidity (Chen et al., 2001) , information asymmetry (Chan et al., 2008) , investor speculation (Mei et al., 2009) , accounting disclosure (Tan, 2011) , corporate governance (Tong and Yu, 2012) , and state ownership (Hou and Lee, 2012) . We offer new insight to this literature by examining the effect of media coverage.
According to the "investor recognition hypothesis" of Merton (1987) , investors are not aware of all securities in an informationally incomplete market. As a result, stocks of firms with lower investor recognition have greater information uncertainty and rational investors would attach to such stocks a higher level of discount rate. By providing information dissemination and credibility to wider audience, media coverage increases investor recognition of firms and reduces information uncertainty, which contributes to the reduction of firms' discount rate.
Foreign share discount is implied from the price difference between A-shares and B-shares issued by the same firm. If media coverage contributes to foreign share discount in China, then we expect the discount to be greater among firms with relatively more local than foreign media coverage. This is because greater local media coverage could lead local investors to attach lower discount rate to A-shares and less foreign coverage could lead foreign investors to attach a higher discount rate to B-shares.
If the effect of media coverage on foreign share discount in China is indeed due to its capability to reach a wider public by reducing information cost and providing credibility, then we expect its effect to be more pronounced among firms with less sell-side financial analyst following and firms with less institutional ownership. When compared to media journalists, financial analysts are have more expertise and knowledge of the firms they follow. Thus, analyst reports are likely to be more informative and therefore supersede media reports in terms of credibility and influence to investors. Thus, media coverage is expected to be less influential on investors among firms where financial analyst researches are more available. When compared to individual investors, institutional investors such as mutual fund are more sophisticated and often have their own buy-side analysts to study the firms they invest. Thus, the investment decisions of institutional investors are less likely to be influenced by media coverage than individual investors.
To test these assertions, we sample A-and B-share dual-listed Chinese firms in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period from 2004 to 2008. For each firm, we count the monthly number of news that appears in influential business press. We select four most established Chinese language business newspapers published in mainland China. This captures the level of media coverage targeting local public, which makes up most of the investors for the A-shares. We select another four most influential English language business newspapers both published in China and abroad (including Wall Street Journal of US and Financial Times of UK). This captures the level of media coverage targeting foreigners, which makes up most of the investors for B-shares. We use the ratio of Chinese to English language news for each firm on a monthly basis as a proxy for the disparity in media coverage available to local and foreign investors.
Our main findings are as follows. First, among firms with relatively more Chinese language relative to English language news, we observe significantly greater level of foreign share discount. This is consistent with more media coverage in Chinese language reducing the discount rate of the domestic A-shares and less media coverage in English language increasing the discount rate of foreign B-shares. Second, the association between media coverage and foreign share discount is more pronounced among firms with less analyst coverage. This is consistent with investor decision being more reliant on media coverage when financial analyst researches are less available. Third, this association between media and foreign share discount is also more pronounced among firms with less institutional ownership. This is consistent with the decision of less sophisticated individual investors being more dependent on media coverage. These findings are robust to controls by other determinant of foreign share discount in China, firm characteristics that influence discount rates, as well as industry, year, and regional effects.
These findings distinguish our study from the few existing studies of media influence on asset pricing in China. A concurrent study by Gong and Gul (2011) examines influence of local media on Chinese domestic stock market but did not address the issue of foreign share discount.
Since the Chinese foreign share discount is considered a "puzzle" by existing literature, our study applies a more unique research setting offered by China. An earlier study by Chakravarty et al (1998) did examine whether foreign share discount in China is influenced by media, but considers only the influence of foreign media and not the local media. Since foreign share discount is derived from the relative price between foreign and local shares, the complete set of media influence would incorporate the effect of both foreign and local media, which our study considers.
Our findings contribute to two strands of the academic literature. In relation to the growing literature on economic development in China, we show that the media coverage contributes to the corporate information environment despite of the widely held view that the Chinese media might be less informative due to tight control. Our evidence shows that media coverage is especially important to reduce the information disadvantage of unsophisticated individual investors, which in turn promotes greater degree of fairness across investor groups. To the established literature on Chinese foreign share discount puzzle, we provide evidence that media coverage plays a role above and beyond determinants identified by previous studies. We show that the foreign share discount influenced by media coverage through investment decisions of unsophisticated individual investors.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design and sample. Section 4 describes our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
Literature and hypotheses

Influence of media on security pricing
There is increasing interest and empirical evidence in the finance literature on the influence of media on security pricing. Klibanoff et al. (1998) show that country-specific news coverage affects the pricing of closed-end country funds. Dyck and Zingales (2003) show that stock prices are more reactive to the type of earnings emphasized by the media and this effect is more pronounced when firms have less analyst coverage or when the media outlet is more credible.
Chan (2003) shows that headline news of firms influences stock return momentum and reversal patterns. Meschke (2004) show increase in stock value and reversal after CEO interviews on CNBC. Tetlock (2007) show that pessimism in media reports predicts downward pressure in stock price and Tetlock et al. (2008) further document that the amount of negative words in news stories also predicts earnings performance. Bushee et al. (2008) show larger stock price and trading volume reaction to earnings announcement among firms with more media coverage. Fang and Peress (2009) show firms with less media coverage earn higher stock returns and that this effect is more pronounced among firms with low analyst following and low institutional investors.
The "investor recognition hypothesis" of Merton (1987) stipulates that in an informationally incomplete market, investors prefer stocks of firms with more information available. Yohn (1998) show smaller bid-ask spread around earnings announcement for firm with greater analyst following. Grullon et al. (2004) show that advertising expenditures increase the liquidity of stocks. Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) document that investors prefer stocks from firms with brand recognition. In addition to these alternative ways in which firms can gain investor recognition, the media facilitates information dissemination, reduces information cost, and provides credibility to a wider public. Indeed, Barber and Odean (2008) show that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks.
The perception from western developed countries is that media is under tight control and political influence in China (e.g. Besley and Prat, 2006; Esarey, 2006 (2011) show mixed evidence on the benefit of media coverage on Chinese stock market. On the one hand, they provide evidence that firms under greater media coverage have lower stock returns and more active trading, which is consistent with media coverage exerting positive influence through the reduction of discount rate and increase of liquidity. On the other hand, they show greater bid-ask spread and analyst forecast dispersion among firms with more media coverage, which suggest that media cause more divergence in opinions among investors.
To gain further insight into the role of media in security pricing of Chinese capital market, our study applies the interesting and well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China as the research setting.
The Chinese stock market and the foreign share discount puzzle
To encourage external capital acquisition and promote economic development, China established stock exchanges separately in the Shanghai and Shenzhen since the early 1990s. By 2001, the market capitalization of China's stock market was already the largest among developing countries. Currently, China has the second largest stock market in the world, only the US being larger. and minority shareholders is higher (Hou and Lee, 2012) . In terms of information asymmetry, Chinese foreign share discount is shown to be correlated with the probability of informed trading (PIN) measure (Chan et al., 2008) , the disparity in accounting disclosure (Tan, 2011) and firm citations in Wall Street Journal headline by Chakravarty et al. (1998) .
Although Chakravarty et al (1998) documented the influence of media coverage on foreign discount of China, they only provide limited analysis and apply an early and short sample period of 1994 to 1996. Furthermore, they only consider influence of foreign media published in English language and do not account for the possible role of local media published in Chinese language. Finally, their evidence assumes media effect to be unconditional and not affected by cross-sectional variations in corporate information environment or type of investors. As recent finance literature pay increasing attention to effect of media on security pricing, we believe the Chinese foreign share discount provides a useful setting and the role of media in this phenomenon deserves more thorough and rigorous study. We fill this literature gap.
Hypothesis development
To generate our research hypotheses, we intersect the two aforementioned strands of literature, i.e. the influence of media on security pricing and the Chinese foreign share discount phenomenon. Media coverage facilitates information dissemination, reduces information costs, and provides information credibility to the wider public (e.g. Dyck and Zingales, 2003) . In a market with incomplete information, investors prefer stocks from firms with more information available (e.g. Merton, 1987 A-price minus B-price) implies the foreign share discount. Chinese language media coverage can be assumed to be more influential to the local investors and English language media coverage can be assumed to affect investment decisions of foreign investors more. Among dual-listed firms with relatively more coverage in Chinese language media than English language media, the discount rate of A-shares is expected to be relatively lower than that of B-shares. This leads to our testable hypothesis:
H1: Firms with relatively higher ratio of Chinese language to English language media
coverage are associated with higher foreign share discount.
There are two critiques against our assumption above. First, perhaps due to English being an international language, the local investors also get influenced by English language media coverage. If so, the A-share discount rate may also decrease as English language media coverage increase. Second, perhaps due to the assumption that local information sources are quicker and more accurate, foreign investors may seek to access Chinese language media coverage through translation service. If so, the B-share discount rate may also decrease as Chinese language media coverage increase. However, these two possible factors would potentially bias against us finding evidence in support of hypothesis H1. As further test, the effects of Chinese and English media coverage on foreign share discount are compared. If
Chinese language media coverage is indeed more influential to A-share investors than B-share investors, then it should be positively related instead of negatively to foreign share discount. If
English language media is indeed more influential to B-share investors than A-share investors, then it should be negatively related to foreign share discount.
An interesting and related issue is whether the Chinese or English media coverage effect plays greater role in foreign share discount. On the one hand, prestigious English language business press published abroad such as Wall Street Journal and Financial Times can assumed to be more independent and therefore more authoritative than Chinese language business press published domestically. Based on this argument, English language press and especially those published abroad should play a greater role in influencing foreign share discount. Indeed, Chakravarty et al. (1998) confirms the effect of Wall Street Journal coverage on Chinese foreign share discount but did not horse-race this against Chinese language media coverage. On the other hand, there are also reasons to believe that Chinese language business press may be more influential on foreign share discount. First, foreign investors have more expertise (e.g.
Froot and Ramadorai, 2007) and access to more sophisticated information channels (e.g.
sell-side analyst for individual investors or buy-side analysts for institutional investors). As a result, they depend less on media coverage than the local investors in China. In other words, even if foreign business press is more authoritative, their influence on Chinese foreign share discount may be limited because foreign investors rely on them less. Second, despite the widely held view from western developed countries that Chinese media is tightly controlled and less independent, it is still possible that Chinese media journalists have more local knowledge and provide richer information relative to their foreign counterparts on business related issues that are not politically sensitive. Existing studies (e.g. Bae et al., 2008) document that local analyst outperform foreign analysts in forecast accuracy. Given these arguments, we hypothesize that:
H2: Foreign share discount is associated more with Chinese language media coverage than
English language media coverage.
The argument above that access to more sophisticated information channel reduces foreign investors reliance on media coverage also applies to local investors. Thus, among firms where sell-side analyst researches reports are more available, even local investors may have less dependence on media coverage. The influence of media coverage on security pricing is also expected to vary across investor groups. Institutional investors have more expertise and often have their own buy-side analyst to evaluate firms. Such investors are less reliant on media when compared to individual investors. Thus, among firms with more institutional investors, the influence of media is also reduced. Given these arguments, we further hypothesize that: There are potential critiques against some of our hypotheses due to the possible differences in the characteristics of Chinese and English media. First, Chinese news may be more positive than English news. However, the reluctance to disseminate negative news by Chinese media will only reduce their informativeness to investors relative to English news. In this case, the effect of Chinese media on stock price should be lower than that of the effect of English media. In other words, the empirical results are more likely to bias against, instead of in favor of, our hypotheses. Second, the release of English news may lag that of Chinese news, which makes the former largely reconfirming the information of the latter. However, we are not looking at the impact of news content per se on stock prices like an event study setting. In that case, earlier released news will incur more share price response than later released news on the same information. Instead, we are looking at the impact of media coverage on stock prices, which is based on well established literature (Merton, 1987; Fang and Peress, 2009 ). The intuition is that more media coverage strengthens information environment of a firm and reduces investors information cost, which in turn affects the discount rate they attach to the firm. If media coverage per se has no affect on share prices, then this would affect both Chinese and English media coverage. In words, the empirical results are again more likely to bias against, instead of in favor of, our hypotheses. 
Sample and methodology
Test of hypotheses
The dependent variable FSD i,t is the foreign share discount of firm i at the end of month t, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. 4 The conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders is assumed to be higher among state-controlled firms and prior to the reform.
RMV i,t-1 is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-shares to B-shares at the end of the previous month. Assuming firm size is inversely related with information asymmetry, firms with a lower B-share than A-share market capitalization can be assumed to have greater information asymmetry between foreign than local investors. RTO i,t-1 is the ratio of the turnover of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. Firms with higher turnover are assumed to be more liquid. RRET i,t-1 is the ratio of the stock returns of A-to B-shares in the last month.
Higher past returns is expected to increase the likeliness of speculation. This particular variable further addresses the relative price movement between A-and B-shares of the same firm.
We incorporate determinants of cost of equity capital in our second set of control variables.
LEV i,t-1 is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year, which measures financial distress.
SALE i,t-1 is the percentage change in sales growth in the last fiscal year, which captures demand-side growth. IROA i,t-1 is the industry median-adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets, and this measure captures firms'
profitability. TQ i,t-1 is the Tobin's Q in the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity, and this measure proxies for firm performance. BETA i,t-1 captures firms' exposure to systematic risk and it is measured as CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI i,t-1 is the percentage change in residual variance or share price informativeness over the last year, which serves as a proxy for changes in the firm-specific information environment. This measure is estimated as the log of [(1-
where R 2 is the goodness-of-fit measure based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns, following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) . 5 These control variables either requires data available from the financial statements (e.g., leverage, sales, profitability, and Tobin's Q) or estimation through past historical return data (e.g., beta and price informativeness). Therefore, they are updated on an annual frequency, based on the previous fiscal year-end values.
Corporate governance qualities make up the third set of control. Governance not only affects the cost of equity capital (e.g., Lombardo and Pagano, 2002) but also has been documented to explain the Chinese foreign share discount (Tong and Yu, 2011 problem. CDUAL i,t-1 is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. The board has less power to monitor CEOs that also serve as the chairman. BINDP i,t-1 is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. Managers are better monitored by independent shareholders who are assumed to have a greater incentive and expertise.
BMEET i,t-1 is 1 for firms with number of board meetings in the last fiscal year above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. More active monitoring is assumed for boards that meet up more frequently. BSIZE i,t-1 is 1 for firms with board size in the last fiscal year above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. These governance control variables are also updated annually, and based on the previous fiscal year-end values.
As the fourth set of control, we also include three sets of dummy variables that control for industry (Industry), year (Year), and regional (Area) fixed effects, respectively. We define industry according to the first two digits of the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) between A-and B-shares of the same firms is 1.1027. Since RTO > 1, this confirms that the B-share market is relatively less liquid than A-share market. In terms of correlation matrix, (2001) and indicates a higher foreign share discount for dual-listers when the B-share stocks are less liquid. The FSD is positively related to leverage (LEV) and negatively related to profitability (IROA), which suggests that foreign share discount is higher for firms with more financial risk and lower for firms that are more profitable. The FSD is negatively related with board independence (BINDP) and board size (BSIZE), which suggests that better monitoring reduces foreign share discount.
[insert Tables 1 and 2 here] Chinese media coverage instead of the English counterpart.
Empirical findings
Tests of H1 and H2
[insert Table 4 here] Table 5 indicates that the empirical evidence in Tables 3 and 4 of the association between foreign share discount and Chinese media coverage mainly exist when more sophisticated information channel such as sell-side analystsare not available. This supports the prediction of Hypothesis H3. 9 . In untabulated robustness checks, we obtain consistent results by using the number of analyst reports as an alternative proxy for analyst following.
Test of H3 and H4
[insert Table 5 ] Table 6 presents the test of Hypothesis H4, which predicts that evidence in support of Hypotheses H1 and H2 occurs mainly among firms with lower institutional fund ownership. As Table 6 indicates that the empirical evidence in Tables 3 and 4 of the association between foreign share discount and Chinese media coverage mainly exist when the security price are influenced more by unsophisticated individual investors than sophisticated institutional investors. This supports the prediction of Hypothesis H4.
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[insert Table 6 ]
Conclusion
The role of media in security pricing in the capital market is receiving increasing attention in the literature. The media is able to influence investors beyond conventional sources of information such as financial statements and analyst researches because it facilitates information dissemination and reduces information costs for the wider public. However, most studies in this area are limited to developed economies such as the US. As a result of institutional differences such as media independence and control, evidence from the US is difficult to be generalized to emerging countries. China is a high growth and increasingly influential transitional economy that is attracting increasing attention from academics, practitioners, and regulators. The foreign share discount puzzle of China is a well-document phenomenon that attracted the substantial interest in the literature over the past decade. Our study provides original evidence that intersects both topics.
We provide four main findings. First, firms with relatively more Chinese than English language media coverage are associated with greater foreign share discount. This is consistent with domestic investors attaching lower discount rate and foreign investors attaching higher discount rate when firm coverage in local media outnumbers foreign media. Second, Chinese language media coverage dominate English language media coverage in terms of association with foreign share discount. This is consistent either with foreign investors being less reliant on media or with local business press being more timely and informative than foreign business press. Third, the two aforementioned effects are more pronounced among firms with less analyst coverage. This is consistent with investors being more reliant on media when more sophisticated and credible sources of information is not available. Finally, the influence of media on foreign share discount is more pronounced among firms with less institutional investors. This is consistent with less sophisticated individual investors being more dependent on media than more sophisticated institutional investors. Note. This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 2004-2008 and includes A-and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. FSD i,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. SOE is 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the years in which the firm begins the process of the Split Share Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RNEWS i,t is the natural logarithm of the ratio of monthly Chinese language news number to the English language news number. CNEWS i,t and ENEWS i,t are natural logarithm of the monthly number of Chinese language news reports and the number of English news reports respectively. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin's Q for the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1-R 2 )/R 2 ] where R 2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75 th or below bottom 25 th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. Analyst following is the number of analysts issuing reports for the firm. Institutional ownership is the proportion of shares owed by mutual fund FSD i,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. RNEWS i,t is the natural logarithm of the ratio of monthly Chinese language news number to the English language news number. CNEWS i,t and ENEWS i,t are the natural logarithm of the monthly number of Chinese language news reports and the number of English news reports respectively. SOE is 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the years in which the firm begins the process of the Split Share Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year.
SALE is the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets.
TQ is the Tobin's Q for the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1-R 2 )/R 2 ] where R 2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75 th or below bottom 25 th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. Note. This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 2004-2008 and includes A-and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. FSD i,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. RNEWS i,t is the natural logarithm of the ratio of monthly Chinese language news number to the English language news number. SOE is 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the years in which the firm begins the process of the Split Share Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin's Q for the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1-R 2 )/R 2 ] where R 2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75 th or below bottom 25 th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. ENEWS i,t are the monthly number of Chinese language news reports and the number of English news reports respectively. SOE is 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the years in which the firm begins the process of the Split Share Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month.
RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin's Q for the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1-R 2 )/R 2 ] where R 2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75 th or below bottom 25 th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. Note. This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 2004-2008 and includes Aand B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We partition the sample by median value of analyst following, which is the number of analysts issuing reports for the firm. FSD i,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. RNEWS i,t is the natural logarithm of the ratio of monthly Chinese language news number to the English language news number. CNEWS i,t and ENEWS i,t are the monthly number of Chinese language news reports and the number of English news reports respectively. SOE is 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the years in which the firm begins the process of the Split Share Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin's Q for the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period.
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